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Rushin'to Join: The Case Of Russia's Accession
to the Council of Europe and the European
Court of Human Rights
Kasey Clemans
n 25 December 1991, the Soviet Union was dissolved.
This event left fifteen republics, once united in a
powerful superpower structure, independent. Upon
independence, Russia quickly moved towards membership
in the Council of Europe (CE) and, therefore, became
subject to the judgments of the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR).ln light of the court's history,! and intemal
ethnic tensions in the Caucasus region, one might wonder
why Russia was so quick to voluntarily yield some of its
sovereignty to an international human rights institution. This
paper will show that Russia's move to join the ECHR was
primarily motivated by Boris Yeltsin's efforts to legitimize
his own rule.

O

Significance
Besides my personal interest in Russia and human
rights, why should anyone else care about Russia's reasons
for joining the ECHR? First, given Russia's past as a
communist country and its rough-and-tumble transition to
democracy, one might be curious as to why Russia was
so eager to join a strong international institution like the
ECHR." What did Russia have to gain by locking itself
into an international institution and surrendering some of
its sovereignty? Second, most of the literature on Russia's
relationship with the CE and the ECHR focuses on what
has transpired since Russia joined the CE and ratified
the ECHR. This paper will fill a gap in the literature
by shedding some light on the factors which pushed
Russia to join the CE and ratify the ECHR. Furthermore,
understanding why Russia joined the ECHR may provide
insights into whether or not Russia is likely to comply with
CE decisions and ECHR rulings, and how Russia might
best be influenced on human rights and democracy issues.
Finally, this paper may also broaden our understanding as

to how newly democratic states function and what the best
approach may be to incorporate them into the international
human rights regime.

Theories
The formation and willingness of states to participate
in strong international institutions typically starts with the
perspective that states are rational unitary actors. They
view human rights enforcement as a desirable outcome
within other states (at least) as well as in their own polity
(at best), but each state faces incentives to defect on its
own human rights protection when it wants to achieve another of its state goals. In order to overcome the tendency
to defect, states set up an international institution to handle human rights enforcement for them. In this way, they
all benefit from centralization, monitoring, and reduced
transaction costS. 3 Caroline Fehl points out that sovereignty costs are the major concern of states functioning as
rational actors. States do not want to give up control over
domestic policy, particularly if it affects how they interact
with their citizens.· This theory as applied to new democracies might suggest that new democracies do not have the
institutions to protect human rights or the means to develop
them. In order to fill this gap, they may sign on to an international institution to benefit from the existing mechanism.
Andrew Moravcsik's theory of "republican liberalism" postulates that new, unstable democracies will yield
sovereignty to an international institution because they
want to "lock-in" democratic practices. s This occurs because policymakers in a new, unstable democracy have
no guarantees about how long their government will retain power; therefore, they seek to prevent a change in
policy in the future by yielding sovereignty over human
rights policy to an international institution. Moravcsik
35
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points out that states faced with the idea of yielding sovereignty will most likely oppose it because they want to
maintain short-term control over policy. States are only
likely to yield sovereignty if they value greater political
certainty in the future more than short-term control over
policy. Thus, new, unstable democracies should be far
more eager to join binding international institutions than
established democracies. 6
Edward Mansfield, Jon Pevehouse, and Emilie
Hafner-Burton, building on Moravcsik, also suggest that
new democracies will be more likely to join international
organizations (lOs) protecting human rights than
established democracies. Where Mansfield, et al. differ
from Moravcsik is that they expect new democracies to
join lOs because these states also want to signal to their
own citizens, as well as the international community,
about their intentions of being a democracy in the future. 7
This signaling helps the state consolidate its position as a
democracy, showing that its democratic actions go beyond
words. Mansfield, et al. also propose that new democracies
join lOs because they are responding to positive incentives
from established democracies. 8
An alternate theory, put forth by Jay Goodliffe and
Darren Hawkins, proposes that states join human rights
regimes because they want to keep good relations with
states on whom they are dependent for various resources.
This dependence varies in intensity based on how much
value the given state places on the particular resource,
and how many alternatives they have for procuring that
resource. The underlying logic is that if state A supports
an international human rights institution, and state B depends on A for a critical resource, then B will be inclined
to accept the human rights institution so as to preclude
any possible sanctions from A.9 Goodliffe and Hawkins
go beyond looking at bilateral relations between states to
viewing states as members of networks with other states.
A clear explanation of why this may be important follows.
Given two states C and D are both new democracies, suppose that C is almost entirely dependent on A for a crucial
resource. In this situation, C will care strongly about A's
views on a particular human rights enforcement mechanism. Now, suppose D is dependent on a variety of states
including A. States C and D are both dependent on A, but
the degree of that dependence is different. Because of that
difference in dependence, C and D may have different attitudes towards the particular human rights institution favored by A. For newly established democracies to yield
sovereignty to an international human rights institution,
the proportion of their ties to states favoring the institution
must be greater than the proportion of their ties to those
states that do not favor the institution.
In his article, Moravcsik cites a realist perspective
that changes the dependence relationship above from one
based on anticipation by the dependent state, to one of
36

coercion by a stronger state or group of stronger states. 10
Hans Morgenthau, E.H. Carr, and others claim that powerful states force weaker states to make decisions in line with
the powerful states' interests. Applied to new democracies
becoming members of an international human rights institution, this theory would expect them to be intimidated by
their more powerful cousins and submit to the powerful
states' demands that they join the particular institution.
In contrast to the realist perspective, there are a
number of idealist approaches to explaining states yielding
sovereignty to international human rights institutions.
These approaches would have us believe that some
governments are altruistic and recognize the value of
human rights and make the decision to join an 10 because
it will further advance the cause of human rights. Less
altruistic states may be influenced by domestic groups
and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to the point
where they believe in the norms and move to enforce them
through an 10. 11
Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink propose that
states are socialized into enforcing human rights through
interactions with the domestic and international community.
These groups confront the particular state and publicize
its human rights abuses. The state, intent on preserving its
current policy, may deny the claims of international actors as
interference in its sovereignty. 1:; Iffaced by domestic actors,
the state may choose to repress them. Domestic groups may
be able to draw international attention to the human rights
abuses of the given government. With time, the state will
begin to make instrumental changes designed to appease
observers without really changing the status quo. 13 The fact
that the state makes any changes whatsoever lends support
to the human rights movement and increases its legitimacy.
Gradually, the state will begin to engage human rights
activists and international actors in a dialogue over what
it should do about human rights. Finally, the state will sign
on to various international conventions that protect human
rights and work to ensure that the rule of law consistently
applies to human rights violations.
Risse and Sikkink's point about states making instmmental changes is further extended by Darren Hawkins. U
Hawkins suggests that governments may make instmmental changes to their human rights policies because they are
seeking legitimacy. Furthermore, governments are not solely concerned with their domestic legitimacy but also with
their international legitimacy. They have three reasons for
their concern: First, support from other states strengthens
the government's right to mle a given state. New governments do not want to be seen as vulnerable or insecure by
their rivals. Second, governments are social entities. As an
international community, governments have accepted standards of behavior to which all legitimate governments must
adhere. As Martha Finnemore and Sikkink put it, "a state
which wants to define itself as a member of the commu-
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nity must act in accordance with the standard of appropriate behavior in the community."15 Third, governments
perceived as illegitimate may be subjected to international
sanction. Furthermore, a lack of support from the international cornmunity might engender greater opposition domestically. Hawkins continues with a list of behaviors that
legitimacy-seeking governments are likely to exhibit. They
may change government practices with respect to human
rights by eliminating murders or disappearances, ending
exile, pardoning political prisoners, and removing government officials who have clearly violated human rights
norms. Additionally, governments may institute a number of surface level changes to "show" that they are doing
more to protect human rights. Among these are creating a
new government office to protect human rights, drafting
a new constitution that includes human rights as a basic
tenet, increasing the independence of judicial institutions,
and improving security and/or intelligence agencies. The
important feature about all of these changes is that they
are meant to look good to international observers while
maintaining the government's control.
Another related explanation for Russia joining the
ECHR is that the CE signaled Russia that membership
in the CE and ratification of the ECHR were not costly.
Pamela 10rdan l6 claims that the CE is the "European organization with the fewest demands on its new entrants."
Perhaps Yeltsin recognized this and moved to become a
member assuming that membership would entail few
costs. One example of a signal would be current CE members not living up to their human rights commitments.
This would show that the CE does little more than talk
about human rights and is not dedicated to ensuring human rights' provision in member states. 18
Finally, there is the possibility that bounded rationality may offer insights into why a state may join a strong
human rights institution. Bounded rationality begins with
the premise that the rational faculties of human beings are
limited in terms of how much information they can sort
through in a given period of time. When decision makers
are confronted with more information than they have time
to evaluate, they are inclined to employ "inferential shortcuts" or "cognitive heuristics" to arrive at a decision more
quickly. I? In his article, Kurt Weyland evaluates the use of
cognitive heuristics to explain policy diffusion. He states:

I,

A bold innovation attracts disproportionate attention
from neighboring countries; it is then widely adopted on
the basis of its apparent promise, not its demonstrated
success. Large numbers of countries also import the
basic policy framework without thoroughly assessing
its fit with their specific requirements and needs. 20
In the current context, the policy in question is membership in the CE and the ECHR. Bounded rationality suggest
that one state made a bold move by joining the CE and

ECHR and that others followed without really considering the long-term effects of such an action. In connection
with the initial policy decision, there are both temporal
and geographic patterns of diffusion. The temporal pattern
indicates that a policy will be slowly adopted at first, followed by a rapid increase in the number of states adopting
it, and finally conclude with a plateau as most states have
either joined or decided not to based on updated information about the consequences of the policy. The geographic
pattern demonstrates that the policy originates in one state
and spreads outward through neighboring states.
In addition to these patterns, bounded rationality also
suggests that states make the decision to pursue the policy
in question based on limited information about the consequences of such a policy. They tend to look more at the
potentially positive effects of a given policy rather than
waiting to see how it functions in practice. Furthermore,
in adopting the given policy, states tend to apply the policy
quite similarly to the initial state's method despite varying political structures and social conditions. Even if the
policy is changed by the state adopting it, it will look more
or less like the original. This is true because the original
form of the policy biasing the other states' perceptions of
that policy in such a way that they do not realize that there
may be other methods for solving the particular problem.
Although states adopting the policy may change certain
parts of it to meet their needs, the policy adopted by successive states tends to strongly resemble the original policy adopted by the first state.

Hypotheses
I expect that Russia's move to join the ECHR was motivated not by Moravcsik's theory of republican liberalism,
but by Yeltsin's efforts to secure his own position. Yeltsin
wanted to bolster the legitimacy of his regime through
democratic reforms. At the time of independence, Russia
had seen the collapse of an ideology that had reigned supreme for more than seventy years. This collapse spurred
Russia's quest for a new identity as a democratic republic. As the democratically elected President of Russia,
Yeltsin was in the perfect position to lead the charge to
democracy. He knew that by pursuing democratic reforms
he could show the world that Russia wanted to become a
democracy. He also knew that by pursuing such a course
he could count on the support of the world's most powerful states. In attempts to make Russia a more democratic
state, he made a number of policy decisions in line with
patterns of behavior of existing democracies. One ofthese
decisions was to pursue membership in the CEo
I also expect that Yeltsin and his advisors did not anticipate the costs associated with joining the ECHR. This
would be explained by political leaders following what
other democratic states had done without sufficient time
to understand what would be required of Russia. Another
37

RUSHIN' TO JOIN

possibility is that Russia understood the costs and was led
by CE signals to believe that they were insignificant. Russia became an observer of the CE in January 1992 and
applied for membership in May of that year. With less
than five months between the end of the Soviet Union and
the submission of Russia's application in the CE, circumstances seem indicative of Russia making a quick decision
based on other states behavior as opposed to signals from
the CEo
Finally, I reject a number of alternative theories for
why Russia would join the CE and ECHR. First, Russia
was not forced to join the ECHR by other more powerful
states. Perhaps other states did offer positive incentives as
Mansfield et al. suggest, however, the drive for Russia's
membership in the ECHR was not initiated by other states,
but by Russia itself. Moreover, I reject Moravcsik's idea
that Russia's leaders sought to "lock-in" human rights
enforcement out of political uncertainty in the future.
While they were indeed in an uncertain position, they
did not seek to tie the hands of some future governing
collective. Instead. Yeltsin was taking advantage of a
Western desire to see a democratic Russia.

Methods/Approach
In determining whether my hypotheses were correct,
I evaluated Russia's actions starting with its efforts to join
the CEo I followed Russia's membership application from
the beginning of 1992 up until 1996 and then continued
onward to its ratification of the ECHR in 1998. Then,
I followed Yeltsin's behavior until he stepped down in
1999. Direct evidence from Yeltsin's cabinet meetings and
records of State Duma discussions were unavailable, so I
relied heavily on the newspaper articles and reported interviews with Russian politicians. I also reviewed relevant
scholarship on Russia's relationship with the CEo Particularly, the work of Emma Gilligan was invaluable in
following the development of human rights protections
in Russia.

Evidence
I. Lock-in
Moravcsik's theory of "republican liberalism" postulates that new, unstable democracies will yield sovereignty
to an international institution because they want to "lockin" democratic practices. 21 This occurs because policymakers in a new, unstable democracy have no guarantees
about how long their government will retain power; therefore, they seek to prevent a change in policy in the future
by yielding some sovereignty over human rights policy to
an international institution. Moravcsik points out that states
faced with the idea of yielding sovereignty will most likely
oppose it because they want to maintain short-term control
over policy. States are only likely to yield sovereignty if
they value greater political certainty in the future more than
short-term control over policy. Thus, new, unstable democ38

racies should be far more eager to join binding international
institutions than established democracies.""
First, the events which took place in Russia from
1992 to 1993 demonstrate that Russia is clearly a new,
unstable democracy. With the August 1991 coup attempt
against Mikhail Gorbachev and the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Yeltsin began 1992 as the
President of a newly independent Russia. Yeltsin enjoyed
a great deal of popular support for standing in front of
the tanks in opposition to the August coup and for being
elected by the people as the President of Russia. However, his administration was not the only major force in
Russian politics. His regime faced daunting opposition
from Vladimir Zhirinovsky, head ofthe nationalist Liberal
Democratic Party, as well as opposition from a congress
where Communist deputies filled 85 percent of the seats.
Yeltsin's main rival for control of Russian politics was
Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov of the Congress of People's
Deputies. These leaders competed for primacy in an unsure arena. As a result, the battle between the president
and the parliament pushed the country into a constitutional
crisis. As Richard Sakwa states, because of a 1990 amendment to the 1978 Russian constitution, "both the executive and the parliament were given supreme state power.
Russia was de jure a parliamentary republic but de facto
became a presidential republic."23 As a result, both parliament and the president sought to strip the other institution of its authority. At the Eighth Congress in March
1993, Khasbulatov and the parliament stripped Yeltsin of
most of his powers and made it possible for his administration to bypass him in introducing legislation. 24 Yeltsin
responded by proceeding with a national referendum asking Russians about their support for his reform policies
and when they felt elections should be called for the president and for the parliament. This referendum renewed
Yeltsin's popular support. He used his new mandate to
convene a constitutional assembly. Unfortunately, once
the draft was completed, parliament still did not pass it.
Finally, on 21 September 1993, Yeltsin issued decree No.
1400 "On Gradual Constitutional Reform in the Russian
Federation." This decree dissolved the Supreme Soviet
and Congress of People's Deputies and transferred the
responsibilities of parliament to the newly created Federal Assembly with the Federation Council becoming the
upper house and the State Duma the lower house. Elections for the State Duma were scheduled for 12 December 1993. The legislature's response to Yeltsin's actions
was armed revolt and refusal to leave the White House.
Amid protests and demonstrations, Yeltsin succeeded in
convincing the military to intervene and stop armed supporters of parliament from seizing various assets across
the city. Khasbulatov and other rebel leaders surrendered
and were imprisoned. According to Sakwa, these actions
"complet[ ed] the revolution of August 1991. Neither the
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banning of the Communist Party, nor the dissolution of
parliament were strictly speaking constitutional acts, but
while deficient in legality, they clearly commanded a high
degree of public legitimacy. "25 The people turned out for
the 12 December 1993 elections and voted in favor of
adopting the new constitution. This new constitution resolved the constitutional crisis by increasing the powers
of the presidency and clarifying the roles of the executive
and the new Federal Assembly.
The purpose of the historical account above is to demonstrate that Russia fits Moravcsik's definition of a new,
unstable democracy. Its institutions were weak and clearly
contradictory. Furthermore, Yeltsin and other reformers
faced bitter opposition from within the parliament. Having established that Russia is a new, unstable democracy,
let us see if there is evidence to support Moravcsik's idea
of republican liberalism.
Moravcsik's argument implies a greater concern
for policy implementation than for the current regime to
maintain control over human rights. Given that premise,
we should see Yeltsin and his administration pursuing
policies that entrench human rights protection in the
Russian system. They would be looking for ways to force
their potential successors to support human rights. We
should also see Russia pursuing additional avenues for
locking in human rights protection such as joining other
human rights institutions beyond the ECHR. Furthermore,
if Moravcsik's argument about new, unstable democracies
is correct and Yeltsin's regime was seeking for long-term
certainty in human rights enforcement, then we should
expect Russia to have joined the ECHR and other human
rights institutions rapidly.

Declaration on the Rights and Liberties of Man and the Citizen
My research has shown that Yeltsin did pursue other
methods of incorporating human rights into domestic policy.
Part of his 1993 draft of the constitution was Section Two,
"On the Rights and Liberties of Man and the Citizen." This
document had been under development since 1990 under the
auspices of the Human Rights Committee of the Congress
of People's Deputies. Despite the efforts of Yeltsin and
members of the Human Rights Committee, the CPD refused
to accept the document as a binding declaration within
the ramifications of the constitution. With the dissolution
of parliament, the full version of "The Declaration of the
Rights and Liberties of Man and the Citizen" was included
in the 1993 constitution and later ratified. This document
laid the foundations for human rights in Russia. Its main
provisions included the right to life and protection against
torture; the right to a fair trial, presumption of innocence
of defendants, prohibition of forced labor; freedom of
association, peaceable assembly, thought. conscience, and
religion; and the right to participate in state politics by
electing and being elected. 26

Human Rights Commissioner
In addition to including a Bill of Rights for the Russian people, the new constitution created a human rights
commissioner. The commissioner was given three responsibilities: 1) investigate human rights abuses, 2) pressure
state organs to improve legislation on human rights, and
3) educate citizens about their human rights and how to
defend them.:!' The commissioner was to be appointed by
the State Duma and was to act according to a forthcoming federal constitutional law. Yeltsin signed the "Federal Constitutional Law on the Commissioner for Human
Rights in the Russian Federation" into law on 26 February
1997. It clarifies the role of the commissioner and grants
him a number of protections from other government institutions. Among these, Article 12.1 states:
The Commissioner possesses inviolability for the
course of the entire term of his powers. Without the
consent of the State Duma, he cannot be prosecuted
under criminal or administrative charges, be subject
to court procedures, be detained, be arrested, be subject to searches, excluding cases of detention at the
scene of a crime, or be subject to personal interrogation, excluding cases when this is stipulated by federallaw for the defence of the security of other persons.
The inviolability of the Commissioner applies to his
residential and work premises, baggage, personal and
work means of transport, correspondence, means of
communication used by him, and documents belonging to him.28
Unless prosecuting authorities receive permission of the
State Duma within twenty-four hours, the commissioner
must be released even if the commissioner is located at
the scene of a crime. The creation of the office of human
rights commissioner and the successive passing offurther
legislation to strengthen the position shows that Yeltsin's
regime sought to increase the degree to which human
rights were protected in domestic legislation.

Presidential Human Rights Commissioner
As a result of the dissolution of the CPD, the Human Rights Committee, which was part of that body, was
dissolved as well. Five days after dissolving parliament,
Yeltsin created a new Presidential Human Rights Commission. This commission's purpose was to establish the core
upon which the human rights commissioner's office would
function once the necessary constitutional law was passed.
Upon installment of the human rights commissioner, the
Presidential Human Rights Commission would remain as
an advisory body to the president. Because the Presidential
Human Rights Commission was a temporary structure from
the beginning, few politicians took it seriously. Its position
in Russian politics was further damaged by the failure to
adequately handle the first real case it investigated. 29 It was
also heavily criticized for its leaders' lack of organization.
39
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Ratification of the ECHR
Another point of evidence in support of Moravcsik's
argument is the relative speed with which Russia ratified
the ECHR once it became a member of the CEo Russia was
admitted to the CE on 28 February 1996. Deliberation over
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms lasted just over two years. Primary
concerns of delegates in the State Duma were over existing
legislation which would need to be amended. 30 They also
expressed doubt over the Russian legal system's ability
to meet international standards. 31 In genera!, however,
the representatives favored adoption of the convention.
Their concerns are best viewed as a desire to fulfill
commitments entered into, rather than reservations about
the convention. The reservations entered upon ratification
of the convention state that they are only in effect until
such time as domestic legislation can be brought into
agreement with the convention.

Death Penalty
One significant example of Yeltsin's personal efforts to enhance human rights protection is his repeated
attempts to eliminate the death penalty. Parties to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms are also expected to ratify Protocol 6
which abolishes the death penalty. When the State Duma
ratified the convention in April 1997, it discussed Protocol
6, but ultimately did not ratify it for fear that public sentiment in Russia was against abolishing the death penalty.
In July of that year, Yeltsin submitted an amendment to
allow death sentences to be carried out only if they are
approved by the prosecutor general and the supreme court
chairman. 32 In January of 1998, Yeltsin signed an amendment to the penal code which would force him to review
the cases of all those sentenced to death, even if they had
not requested clemency.33 A few weeks later, the Supreme
Court ruled that the death penalty could no longer be exacted except by jury.3" However, the jury system was only
implemented in nine of the eighty-nine regions, so the
court put a moratorium on the regions with the jury system
as well until such time as it could be introduced in all regions. This effectively placed a moratorium on the use of
the death penalty. However, that was not enough for President Yeltsin. In June 1999, he signed a decree which commuted existing death sentences to prison terms. 35 Finally,
in August 1999, just three months before he stepped down,
Yeltsin renewed efforts to push ratification of Protocol 6
through the State Duma. However, the State Duma did not
follow through on the proposed legislation, and Protocol
6 remains unratified by Russia to the present day. Yeltsin's
efforts to abolish the death penalty in Russia were numerous and frequent. He used every means available to act in
accordance with the ideals of the CE to keep people from
being executed.
40

Lingering questions remain about Yeltsin's true intentions. Did he genuinely care about human rights? Was his
obedience to CE requirements based on a desire to protect
human rights or was it based on his own desire for international legitimacy? Was the war in Chechnya an exception to the rule or the exposure of his true character?
Were concerns over maintaining his position as president
in the 1996 elections a driving force behind his actions in
Chechnya? The next section will examine available information in an effort to resolve these questions.

II. Legitimacy
An alternative explanation to Moravcsik's idea of
"lock-in" is that Yeltsin pursued human rights reforms as a
method for boosting his own popularity and legitimacy. By
joining the CE, Yeltsin could, as Jordan states, "legitimize
[his] new regime.":lG Yeltsin was most concerned with his
own political career and, therefore, sought ways to influence how he was viewed abroad. The purpose of joining the
CE was to garner support from the international community that would strengthen him against domestic political
opponents. Yeltsin was a political opportunist who boldly
gambled by opposing the coup in 1991, and later capitalized
on the dissolution of the Soviet Union. January 1992 found
him in the perfect position to take advantage of international naivete. To all Western observers, the evil empire had
finally fallen. They could only hope that from the remnants
of the superpower would be born a new democracy.
During his two terms in office, Yeltsin made use
of his image as a democratic reformer on the world
stage. He knew that by acting the part of a democratic
leader, he would garner tremendous support from the
most powerful and wealthy states in the world. In terms
of Russian domestic political structures, Yeltsin faced
tremendous opposition from Communist and Nationalist
factions within the parliament. Preeminent among
parliamentarians was Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov.
As previously mentioned, Khasbulatov spent 1992 and
1993 vying for political supremacy in Russia. In the end,
Yeltsin went around the existing constitution to disband
the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's
Deputies. Furthermore, he called out the military and
urged them to attack the holed-up parliamentarians in
the Russian White House. This debacle resulted in the
deaths of 146 people in a single day.3' Although many
Russian citizens strongly disliked their parliamentary
leaders, they still criticized Yeltsin for the violent manner
in which he handled the situation. Despite the negative
impact on Yeltsin's domestic legitimacy, he went on
almost unscathed in the international scene. The Council
of Ministers' statement is particularly striking:
We, Heads of State and Government of CE member
States ... express our deep concern over recent events
in the Russian Federation. We deplore the heavy loss
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of life which resulted from the resort to violence,
provoked by opponents of reform.
We declare our solidarity with the supporters of the
reforms under the leadership ofPresident Boris Yeltsin
and express hope that the process of democratization
will be continued with determination. 38
In spite of the fact that his methods in resolving the conflict were both violent and unconstitutional, the CE supported Yeltsin and believed that by so doing they were
supporting democratic reforms. The rest of this section
will demonstrate how Yeltsin used human rights to foster
his own political security.

Elections
One of the stipulations for membership in the CE
was that Russia held free and fair elections. Yeltsin did
this in accordance with the stipulation of the council.
Initially, the agreement Yeltsin made was that both
presidential and parliamentary elections would take place.
But after the parliamentary elections of December 1993,
Yeltsin managed to forget to hold presidential elections
six months later as he had promised. 39 This shows that
Yeltsin complied entirely with the council's requirement,
but was able to renege on a related promise he had made
in domestic circles to hold presidential elections. Thus,
he was able to reduce his chances of being removed from
power and he gained additional international legitimacy.
1993 Constitution
In conjunction with the elections, there is the issue
of the 1993 constitution itself. When Yeltsin disbanded
parliament, he was able to put forward his own draft of
the constitution for the December 1993 referendum. This
version of the constitution included the previously mentioned "Declaration of the Rights and Liberties of Man
and the Citizen." Besides including protection of human
rights in the document, Yeltsin added a number of key features to bolster the power of the president relative to the
parliament. Among these were the power of the president
to issue legally binding decrees not subject to State Duma
approval and the power to dissolve parliament if they rejected his nomination for prime minister three successive
times. The strength of the president was a major concern
for parliament during the 1993 battle over constitutional
reform. They feared that such a powerful presidency in the
wrong hands would leave Russia under the control of an
autocrat. While the 1993 constitution did not force Yeltsin
to choose between including human rights protections and
his own political gain, it is illustrative that he was adept at
pursuing human rights while at the same time improving
his political prospects.
Presidential Human Rights Commission Revisited
Besides looking at the Presidential Human Rights
Commission as a positive step towards entrenching human

rights in Russia, it may also be viewed from the standpoint of Yeltsin's own political interests. When Yeltsin
disbanded the parliament, its Human Rights Committee
also ceased to exist. This void left Yeltsin with the opportunity to create a new institution that was both within
his administration and entirely dependent upon him for
support. A noteworthy case that demonstrates the failure
of the Presidential Human Rights Commission to improve
the application of human rights practices surfaced when
Yeltsin issued the "Decree on Banditry." Contrary to the
constitution, the decree allowed searches without warrants, detention without appearing before a judge or even
being charged for up to thirty days, wire taps, and access
for law enforcement personnel to banking and commercial documents of suspected criminals without a warrant. -10 In response to this decree, Sergei Kovalyov, head
of the Presidential Human Rights Commision, made impassioned pleas to Yeltsin via letters, a television interview, and a vigorous press campaign against the decree.
Yeltsin's only response was to allow Kovalyov to form a
monitoring group. This episode marks a turning point in
Yeltsin and Kovalyov's relationship from two men united
by principles, to two men divided by politics.
Why would Yeltsin, a champion of human rights,
not intervene once he understood the ramifications of
his decree? The answer is simple: crime. At this time,
politicians across the spectrum were concerned about the
rampant increase in criminal activity. From 1988 to 1994
the number of registered crimes rose from 1,220362 to
2,632,708, an increase of more that 200 percent in six years
time. -ll Large segments of the population were concerned
over crime and wanted to see public officials take decisive
action against it. Yeltsin knew this and decided to issue
the aforementioned decree. His act shows once again
that political expediency is more important to him than
bolstering human rights. He refused to even entertain the
idea that law enforcement could be improved without
resorting to violating the citizen's human rights.

Chechnya
Up until 1994, Yeltsin's administration had a decent
record on human rights. There were still rampant human
rights abuses across the country, but Yeltsin was actively
working with Kovalyov and other human rights advocates
to address these issues. With the beginning of the first
Chechen War in November 1994, Yeltsin and Kovalyov
began moving in different directions. Yeltsin was deeply
concerned over public opinion and could not afford
to appear soft on crime or separatism. Kovalyov was
determined to see that human rights were protected. When
Russian troops began attacking Chechnya, Kovalyov
decided to go to Chechnya to see what was going on. His
efforts to get to Chechnya were repeatedly blocked. First,
he was unable to book seats on a flight to the Chechen
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capital Grozny. Then, the First Vice-Premier called to
inform him that he could get Kovalyov and his working
group seats on a plane the following day. However, there
were only five seats available. In choosing who would
go, Kovalyov made certain that he had representatives
from across the political spectrum in his party so that the
majority of Duma legislators would be willing to listen
to the working group's conclusions. On their way to
Chechnya, the plane was told that they would not be able
to land in Mozduk, because of ice on the runway and were
instead diverted to Chkalovskaya. When they arrived, they
saw a mail carrier plane that was headed to Mozduk, but
were refused permission to take the flight. The next day
the group was turned back yet again. Finally, they went
to a civilian airport and took a flight landing them within
driving distance ofChechnya and then made the rest ofthe
trip by car. The lengths that Kovalyov and his team were
forced to go to in order to get to Chechnya indicate that
some leaders in Moscow did not want them to see what
was actually happening in Chechnya.
Upon arrival in Chechnya, Kovalyov and his
working group were stunned by the lack of effort made
for constructive dialogue. Even more troubling was
the lack of provisions made by Russian forces to allow
civilians to flee Grozny. Before any attempt at dialogue
was made, Russian aircraft began bombing the city.
Kovalyov pointed to numerous bombs and rockets that
hit civilian areas of the city where there were no military
installations. His impassioned pleas to Yeltsin to stop
the bombing and to attempt to resolve the issues without
resorting to force went unheeded. At this point Yeltsin
was actively supporting positive propaganda about the
war effort in Chechnya. In contrast, Kovalyov and his
working group were doing all they could to disseminate
information on the human rights abuses-particularly the
high levels of civilian casualties in Chechnya. Besides
ignoring Kovalyov's pleas, leaders back in Moscow began
an intensive campaign vilifying Kovalyov as a dissident.
Upon his return to Moscow, Kovalyov asked for a meeting
with Yeltsin and was rejected. Upon threatening to reveal
to the press that the president had refused to meet with
him, Yeltsin's aide called back a short time later and set
the meeting for the following day.
The meeting between Yeltsin and Kovalyov provided
the final break between the two actors who had worked
together on human rights issues many times previously.
Kovalyov stressed the impact the bombings were having on the civilian popUlation and Yeltsin responded that
Kovalyov had poor information and that the bombings had
stopped. Yeltsin made it clear that he would not be working with Kovalyov to resolve the Chechen conflict or its
attendant human rights abuses. J2 For the first time, KovaIyov had to go outside of the presidency to find support for
his efforts to end human rights abuses. He decided to work
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through Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. He sent
Chernomyrdin a proposal for a cease-fire in Chechnya. A
few days letter, Chernomyrdin presented the proposal to
the Chechen side via a television broadcast. On the 17'h
of January, Chernomyrdin met with Chechen representatives in Moscow. They decided that the cease-fire would
begin the following day at 5 P.M. Despite these efforts,
Russian military leaders did not show up for scheduled
meetings with Chechen officials on the 18 th of January.
Furthermore, Yeltsin issued a statement saying the he was
not willing to negotiate with Dzhokhar Dudayev, leader
of the Chechen forces, because Dudayev was committing
genocide against his own people. J3 Fighting commenced
again the following day.
In a last-ditch effort to stop the violence in Chechnya,
Kovalyov brought the case before the Constitutional Court.
The key issue was a secret decree which Yeltsin had issued
on 30 November 1994 to institute a state of emergency in
Chechnya. The entire military campaign in Chechnya was
based on this decree. Because Yeltsin issued the decree
in secret, he had violated constitutional provisions which
required that the State Duma approve any declaration of a
state of emergency. The situation was further complicated
by Yeltsin's secret rescindment of the decree, on 5
December, after he signed the Organization of Security
and Co-operation in Europe's (OSCE) Code of MilitaryPolitical Aspects of Security. By signing this document,
Yeltsin agreed that "any decision about the direction of its
armed forces for the execution of intemal security will be
taken in accordance with constitutional proceedings."JJ
Yeltsin then made another decree without any mention
of a state of emergency on 9 December. In its ruling, the
Constitutional Court rejected references to the 30 November
decree because it had now been abolished. Furthermore, the
court supported Yeltsin's right to "ensure state security."JS
The court also said that the 9th of December decree did not
violate the constitution and recommended that the State
Duma pass a more comprehensive set oflaws for governing
the use of Russian military within Russia. JG In summary,
Kovalyov's last hope for correcting human rights abuses by
the Russian military failed to produce any change.
In response to his defeat before the Constitutional
Court and Yeltsin's unyielding devotion to continued
military action in Chechnya, Kovalyov tendered his
resignation on 23 January 1995. The text of his resignation
letter to President Yeltsin follows:
You began your democratic career as a forceful and
energetic crusader against official deceit and Party
despotism, but you are ending it as the obedient
executor of the will of the power-seekers in your
entourage .... I considered myself obliged to remain
in your administration as long as my status enabled
me on occasion, even if only in isolated instances, to
counteract government policies that had violated human
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rights and humanitarian values. Perhaps even now such
opportunities have not been totally exhausted. But I
can't go on working with a president whom I believe to
be neither a supporter of democracy nor a guarantee of
the rights and liberties of my fellow citizens. I hereby
inform you that, as of today, I resign as Chairman of the
President's Human Rights Commission, as a member
of the Presidential Council, and as a member of all
other presidential bodies.·"
Kovalyov's resignation is a stunning indictment ofYeItsin
and his policies. Until the conflict in Chechnya began,
Yeltsin appeared to be a stalwart supporter of human
rights initiatives, often pushing them forward in the face of
tremendous opposition from the State Duma. He worked
together with Kovalyov on a wide variety of issues. They
succeeded in including a Bill of Rights in the December
1993 constitution. I cannot help but agree with Kovalyov's
assessment of Yeltsin's character. Yeltsin was good at
supporting human rights when they furthered his political
agenda. Unfortunately, when Yeltsin's political future came
into conflict with human rights protection he consistently
ran roughshod over his previously professed principles.
The evidence listed in this section clearly points in favor
of legitimacy-seeking. As predicted by Hawkins. Yeltsin
implemented a number of instrumental changes which he
could use to show that he was forwarding human rights.
Foremost among these are his drafting of a new constitution
which includes human rights and his creation of a weak
Presidential Human Rights Commission. Additionally, he
also made sure it was publicized when he closed the last
gulag and freed Russia's "last" political prisoner.·s Overall,
the period from 1992 to 1999 is replete with Yeltsin's efforts
to legitimize his own rule.

III. Signals from the CE
An explanation for Russia joining the ECHR related
to that of legitimacy is that the CE signaled Russia that
membership in the council and ratification of the ECHR
were not costly. The following sections evaluate potential
signals from Russia in terms of how costly membership in
the CE and later the ECHR would be.

Signals of Wish
The primary evidence for the CE signaling Russia
that it would not be held accountable for its actions comes
from observing current member states. From the time
that Russia joined the CE, it was under pressure to ratify
Protocol 6 and abolish the death penalty. This is particularly
important given that long-time members such as Great
Britain, Turkey, and Cyprus had not abolished the death
penalty yet and were not being sanctioned by the council.· 9
Russia could look at those cases and decide that it might
be able to ignore the council's statements with impunity.
Even the Secretary General of the CE recognized that

"none of the thirty-nine members are fully implementing
to the letter the obligations they undertake."50
Another important factor is that the council was willing
to overlook numerous human rights violations continuing
in Russia even as it admitted Russia to the council. The
official opinion of the council was that Russia did not
meet the criteria for membership, but perhaps member
states would be able to have more of an impact on Russia
if it were a member state, than if it were an outsider. As
a result, numerous flagrant human rights violations were
overlooked. Furthermore, it is worth bearing in mind that
many of the states felt that approving Russia's accession
to the CE was a direct reflection on their approval for
President Boris Yeltsin's democratic reforms.

Signals of Will
The CE repeatedly increased the requirements which
Russia would have to meet in order to become a member of the CEo In July 1993, the CE specified that Russia
would need to hold free and fair parliamentary elections
and adopt a new constitution before it could accede to the
CE.51 Russia accomplished both of these feats in December 1993. Then in January 1994, the CE made Russia's
withdrawal of troops from Latvia, Estonia, and Moldova a
precondition for membership in the council. 52 After completing this requirement, Russia was certain that it would
be readily admitted to the CEo However, the unfolding of
war in Chechnya forced the CE to rethink its position. In
February 1995, the council decided to "freeze" Russia's
application for membership until such a time as Russia
could show that hostilities in Chechnya had ceased. 53 Only
with the announcement of a cease-fire was Russia granted
membership in the CE on 28 February 1996. These incidents clearly show that the CE made demands of Russia in
order for Russia to become a member. Each of these signals presented a tangible cost to the Russian government.
In order to become a member of the CE it had to change
its constitution, pull troops out of three foreign countries,
and negotiate a cease-fire in a domestic war. What is particularly remarkable is not only that Russia yielded to each
of the council's requirements, but the relative speed with
which Russia implemented them. In each case, Russia
complied within six to twelve months of notification of
the requirements. Clearly, both the demands of the council and the concessions made by Russia officials were extremely significant.

IV. Bounded Rationality
In his article on policy diffusion, Weyland describes
the spread of policy from one country to another as a wave.
He says that the wave begins slowly, then quickly increases, and then levels off. This cumulative frequency curve of
countries adopting a given policy is roughly S-shaped. 5•
The absolute frequencies for countries adopting a particular
policy in a given time frame should look like a bell curve.
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He further postulates that these waves of policy distribution tend to be localized to a given region. The policy
may start in one country and then spread to neighboring
countries. In the case of Russia joining the CE, both the
temporal and geographic relationships that he discusses
are replicated. The chart below shows that the cumulative frequency of states joining the CE approximates an
S-curve. The process begins slowly from 1989 to 1992,
but rapidly increases between 1992 and 1997, at which
point it slows down again significantly. The absolute
frequencies of states joining the CE in a given year also
match the bell curve that he discusses. The chart shows
that an approximate bell shape could be drawn with its
peak around 1994.
Weyland also discusses how waves spread geographically. In the case of eastern European states
joining the CE, this expectation also holds true. The
wave starts in Finland in 1989, moves through a number of eastern European states, then the Baltic states,
then southeastern European states, eventually covering
Ukraine and Russia and ending up in the Caucasus. I
found that the temporal and geographic relationships
were the only parts of his theory which readily applied
to Russia joining the CE and the ECHR.
Next, there is the idea that states follow other states
III implementing a particular policy while at the same
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time being ignorant of the potentially negative consequences of the new policy. In Russia's case, it is clear that
politicians knew going into the process what membership
in the council would entail. This is demonstrated by numerous public statements from Russian politicians. The
most prominent of these was given by Foreign Minister
Andrei Kozyrev in 1992 when he delivered Russia's application for accession to the council. He said, "Russia
will recognize the obligatory jurisdiction of the European
Court and the right of citizens to submit individual petitions, and develop cooperation within the framework of
the European Charter on Fundamental Social Rights."55
Thus, the obligations to which Russia would be held
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should have come as no surprise. Furthermore, the sheer
length of time that it took Russia to actually be accepted
as a member casts heavy doubt on politicians' ability to be
ignorant of the consequences of membership. While it is
possible that they initially did not expect membership in
the CE or ECHR to cost a great deal, the previously listed
evidence, about strong signals from the CE, shows that
Russia had a four-year period of interaction with the CE in
which it did exact heavy costs from Russia.
Given the policy decision of whether or not a state
joins the ECHR, there is no variance in how a state decides to join. It may decide to apply for membership or
not. Since there is no variance in this policy question, it
seems clear that this particular component does not apply
to Russia's membership in the CE or ECHR.

Conclusions
This paper shows that although Yeltsin participated in a
number of human rights measures, his overall intent points
more to political expediency and efforts to legitimize his
rule rather than efforts to lock-in human rights practices.
He sought democratic reforms and improvements in
human rights that would be noticed by international actors
and bolster their support for him, thus securing his own
position. Further evidence for this idea was demonstrated
by Yeltsin's lack of attention to human rights in particular
as they concerned crime prosecution procedures and
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efforts to protect civilians in Chechnya. Thus, I find that
my first hypothesis is strongly supported.
Additionally, while arguments can be made for both
strong signals and weak signals from the CE, the preconditions Russia had to meet in order to become a member
provide convincing evidence that the council sent signals
that it was not going to provide international legitimacy
for Russia. Russia had to pay the costs of membership and
resolve substantial issues with respect to current implementation of human rights practices. Bounded rationality provides a good explanation for how Russia learned
about the CE and its membership prospects. Also, the
data provide evidence that states in eastern Europe joined
the CE as a part of a wave of policy diffusion. The data
from the section on CE signals contradict the idea that
Russia was ignorant of the potential costs of membership
in the CE and ECHR. Russia was put through a four-year
probation during which the CE successfully demanded
changes in Russian policy. Thus, my second hypothesis
was strongly rejected.
A final caveat to these findings is in order. The data
used in supporting and rejecting the research hypotheses
was based heavily on newspaper reports of events as they
occurred in Russia. While the articles are numerous and
agree on almost every account, they only represent the
public side of Russia's move to join the CE and ECHR.
Information from Yeltsin's personal conversations and
State Duma sessions would provide valuable insight to the
validity of this research.
Despite my findings that Yeltsin pursued membership
in the CE and the ECHR to secure his own legitimacy, the
fact that the CE was able to exact changes out of Russia
is still significant. As Hawkins states, these changes may
very well create the room for groups genuinely interested
in furthering human rights to push their agenda forward. 56
My hope is that future research will explore further
development of domestic and international human rights
pressures on Russia to evaluate whether the CE made the
right decision in allowing Russia to become a member in
1996 or if it should have continued demanding reforms
until Russia met a higher standard.
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